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Introduction
IPO auction and bookbuilding models emphasize the economic importance of information flows from investors to the issuer (or underwriter) during the pre-IPO phase.
The importance of these flows is motivated as follows. Information asymmetry among investors creates a winner's curse and depresses prices (Rock, 1986) . A rational response, therefore, is to design a mechanism to extract private information before the price is set, thereby mitigating the winner's curse.
Any such mechanism entails costs. The question then becomes which is cheaper: designing a pre-IPO mechanism to extract and aggregate this information (e.g., Benveniste and Spindt, 1989) or simply bearing the adverse selection costs (e.g., Rock, 1986) ? Equivalently: is price discovery more efficient in the primary market or in the secondary market?
We study primary market information aggregation by looking at price revisions, defined as the percentage change from the midpoint of the original filing price range to the final IPO offer price. In the U.S., this period fully captures the impact of the underwriter's bookbuilding efforts because soliciting investor opinions before the initial filing range is set is prohibited by the Securities Act of 1933. 1 Obviously, information revealed by investors may be either good or bad news, and so this price discovery process leads to dispersion in price movements. (Without new information, there is no reason for prices to change.) In that spirit, our primary methodology is to compare cross-sectional variability in price movements during the bookbuilding phase to that of the secondary market. By doing so, we hope to shed light on how much information is aggregated in primary markets rather than secondary markets.
Our first observation is that reputable underwriters revise their filing prices more aggressively. This is a very robust and dramatic feature of our data. For example, across IPOs underwritten by low-quality banks (Carter-Manaster ranking below 6.75) the standard deviation of observed price pre-IPO revisions (the change from the midpoint of the initial filing price range to the final offer price) is 17.0%. For reputable banks (Carter-Manaster ranking above 8.5) this standard deviation is 28.1%. Thus price revisions are 65% more variable for reputable banks.
Perhaps more dramatically, low-quality banks exhibit strong clustering on price changes of exactly zero. For underwriters of Carter-Manaster rank five and lower, a revision of zero occurs nearly half the time. For underwriters of rank nine this event occurs only 11% of the time. This frequency decreases monotonically in underwriter reputation ranking. Clearly, a price revision of zero is consistent with no important information being revealed during bookbuilding. Overall, our evidence suggests that reputable underwriters acquire information much more actively during the bookbuilding phase and incorporate that information into the price.
Price discovery in the primary market should substitute for price discovery in the secondary market. Hence, given the strong difference in primary market pattern mentioned earlier, one might expect reduced aftermarket volatility for IPOs taken public by reputable underwriters. Indeed, we find support for this hypothesis in most subperiods in our sample. (The IPO bubble is a prominent exception; this is discussed in greater detail in Section 3.2) This univariate evidence is of limited power, however, since reputable and non-reputable underwriters issue very different types of IPOs. Offerings by reputable underwriters are much more likely to be high-tech and venture capital backed, among other differences.
We control for these differences in two ways. We employ the standard firm characteristic controls (size, age, VC backing, etc.) in our regressions. These controls are insufficient, however, if the asymmetric information profile of firms approaching high and low quality underwriters is different. 2 For our main test, we are interested in the relative return variability in the primary and secondary markets, i.e. not how much total information is aggregated, but rather when this aggregation occurs (before vs. after the issue goes public). In this spirit, we form the following ratio: cross-sectional variability of secondary market returns divided by cross-sectional variability of price movements in the primary market (i.e., percentage 2 In principle, this effect could go either direction. Certification reduces risk, ceteris parabus. On the other hand, firms with high ex-ante risk (but correspondingly high expected returns) have the strongest incentive to seek certification. If certification is imperfect then ex-post risk may still be higher for reputable underwriters.
change from the filing range midpoint to the offer price). This ratio functions as an additional control for unobservable differences, because heightened ex-ante asymmetric information inflates both the numerator and the denominator.
Reputable underwriters have lower variance ratios in the full sample and in every five-year subperiod. Hence, a greater proportion of this risk is resolved in the primary market rather than the secondary market when a reputable bank is employed.
While the variance ratio results indicate differences in the amount of information aggregation, they are silent on the actual price discovery mechanism employed. Here the literature offers guidance, as well as an additional testable implication. Benveniste and Spindt (1989) model predicts that IPO prices should only partially adjust to information revealed in the primary market. Their intuition is as follows. Investors realize that divulging good information leads to higher prices. Naturally, this makes it difficult to extract favorable information. To counteract the incentive to hide positive information, the underwriter adjusts prices by less than warranted when good information is revealed.
Consequently, file price revisions and initial returns should be positively correlated.
In the context of our aforementioned results -high-quality underwriters are more active in the information aggregation role -this paradigm predicts more pronounced partial adjustment for reputable underwriters. We find strong support for this hypothesis. The correlation between file price revisions and underpricing is .430 for underwriters in the top tercile (Carter-Manaster rank above 8.5) but only .141 for underwriters in the bottom tercile (Carter-Manaster rank below 6.75). A correlation of .141 corresponds to an R 2 of less than 2% so that there is effectively no relation between the two variables, which is consistent with Rock's model rather than that of Benveniste and Spindt. We conclude that the partial adjustment noted by the literature in the cross-section is almost exclusively due to the behavior of reputable underwriters. Consistent with our variance ratio results, this evidence suggests the information acquisition paradigm is better suited for reputable underwriters.
One potential complication is that IPO prices tend to partially adjust to public information as well as private information. This empirical regularity is not an implication of Benveniste and Spindt's model. Disagreement over both the magnitude and interpretation of these results constitutes one of the most active areas of current IPO research. 4 However, resolving this puzzle is outside the scope of the current analysis, which instead focuses on the extent to which private information is incorporated in the primary market rather than the secondary market. That is, our research question addresses the asymmetric information problem caused by investors' private information rather than the ability of a given sale mechanism to react to public information. Partial adjustment to public information therefore acts as a control variable in our analysis rather than a variable of direct interest.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we describe the data and the methodology. Section 3 summarizes the evidence of price revisions and variance ratios.
Section 4 repeats the variance ratio analysis using each underwriter (rather than each IPO) as the unit of observation. Section 5 examines how partial adjustment to private information varies with underwriter quality. Section 6 concludes.
Data and Methodology
The data for this study was drawn from the Thompson SDC database and consists of initial public offerings of equity for the period 1980 through 2006. We exclude unit offers, ADRs, REITs, limited partnerships, closed-end funds and IPOs with an offer price lower than five dollars. Information for each IPO was collected regarding the initial filing range, the offer price, the number of shares sold, the identity of the underwriter, whether the firm was backed by a venture capitalist or not, and whether the firm operates in a high-tech industry or not. The above sample is supplemented with a hand-collected dataset of IPOs from 1980 to 1984, available from Jay Ritter's website. In the case of overlapping observations (e.g., an IPO in both datasets), Ritter's data enables us to backfill missing variables in SDC. Whenever there is disagreement on a variable, we use Ritter's value. 4 Bradley and Jordan (2002) take it as evidence against the efficiency of the IPO process; partial adjustment is, after all, a literal violation of weak-form market efficiency. Loughran and Ritter (2002) , Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2005) and Ince (2007) emphasize the agency problem between issuers and banks. Edelen and Kadlec (2005) develop a tradeoff model based on the relative costs of going public and staying private, in which issuers may rationally choose higher underpricing given positive shocks to public comparables.
We supplement the dataset with the Carter-Manaster reputation rank of each underwriter and age of the firm, both of which are obtained from Jay Ritter's website.
Carter-Manaster ranks range from 1 (lowest quality) to 9 (highest quality), and Ritter's website evaluates these ranks over separate time periods. When an IPO is underwritten by multiple lead underwriters, we average the reputation of all involved banks, though rank differences are typically small. In what follows, we use "high-reputation" and "highquality" interchangeably.
We merge this database with CRSP in order to compute monthly returns, excluding those IPOs which lack data in six months or more during the first 12 months following the offering. When time-series volatility is studied, we use daily prices instead, also extracted from CRSP. Our final sample consists of 7,124 completed offerings.
In addition, we extract the deal characteristics (including underwriter identification) for 1,700 withdrawn IPOs for the same period. This inclusion is important in our study because we focus on the information revealed during bookbuilding. Clearly this information is correlated with the decision to continue or withdraw, and so our completed offering sample suffers from a censoring problem. Section 5 discusses Heckman's (1976 Heckman's ( , 1979 two-step procedure employed to address this censoring.
We order our sample by (average) underwriter rank. IPOs are grouped into one of three categories: average rank 8.5 or higher, rank between 6.75 and 8.5 and rank below 6.75. These breakpoints divide our sample into three nearly equal subsamples. (Because of integer problems in underwriter ranking, there is no other division that splits our sample more evenly.) Our results are qualitatively similar with other divisions.
Pre-IPO Price Revisions
For each IPO, we calculate the offer price's deviation from the midpoint of the filing range as follows
where MidFile represents the midpoint of the initial filing price range. This is the standard definition of pre-IPO price revision (e.g., Hanley, 1993 Bradley and Jordan (2002) . IPOHeat is orthogonalized against COMPS in order to isolate the information coming from the IPO market specifically rather than the overall heat of the equity markets. Finally, PREV is orthogonalized against both COMPS and IPOHeat to obtain a measure (REV) that isolates the private information revealed by bookbuilding.
Earlier drafts of this paper used raw price revisions PREV rather than publicinformation-adjusted revisions REV. The results are similar.
Holding Period Horizons
Our methodology requires us to specify a time by which price have incorporated pre-IPO private information. Several institutional factors contribute to the inefficiency of early aftermarket prices. First, lead underwriters engage in price support during the first month or so of trading (Aggarwal, 2000) . Second, IPOs are difficult to short-sell in the immediate aftermarket (Loughran and Ritter, 1995) . Third, underwriters employ a system known as the Depository Trust Company's (DTC) tracking system which aims to discourage investors from "flipping" the stock. All of these institutional features tend to impede the price discovery role of the market.
These institutional features are particularly troublesome in the current setting.
Price support truncates the return distribution at zero, which tends to reduce dispersion, 5 Note that Low-quality underwriters therefore have even smaller price revisions under this alternative measure than under the reported measure. our main variable of interest. As a result, secondary market dispersion may vary with underwriter quality even without differences in primary market price discovery. This reinforces the notion that very short horizons might be inappropriate for our purposes. 6 On the other hand, estimates of long-run abnormal returns are noisy (Kothari and Warner, 1997) . Moreover, much of the variation occurring at very long horizons is unrelated to ex-ante private information of IPO investors, which is the information of interest in the current study. To balance these tradeoffs, we focus on buy-and-hold returns at 3-month horizons. We also present results at 6-month horizons as a robustness check. Other drafts of the paper have employed 1-month and 12-month horizons as additional robustness checks, with broadly similar results.
Cross-Sectional Variance in Aftermarket Returns
For our cross-sectional results, we use monthly CRSP returns. The abnormal return for stock i at month T is defined as
where r it denotes the return on stock i in month t, and m it denotes the return on the market (proxied by the CRSP stock file value-weighted market index) at time t. Here the implicit assumption is that the market serves as a reasonable measure of expected return for stocks in our sample. Our cross-sectional results are insensitive to the choice of benchmark, however. We note that the benchmark choice is more critical for event studies that focus on the mean rather than (as in our case) the variance, because nearly all of our cross-sectional variance is firm-specific rather than driven by the benchmark. Van Bommel, Dahya, and Shi (2006) argue that most private information is incorporated within a few days. The possibility that price support practices systematically vary with underwriter quality is irrelevant in their setting because they study information aggregation in the cross-section. On the other end of the spectrum, Ellul and Pagano (2006) employ horizons of 40 weeks and Boehmer, Boehmer and Fishe (2006) argue that private information may persist for as long as two years.
Main Results
that reputable underwriters are more likely to offer IPOs that are venture capital backed and in high-tech industries. Their issues are older on average and tend to raise larger proceeds than other IPOs. Taken together, these variables have an ambiguous impact on the severity of asymmetric information across terciles: firm size and seasoning should mitigate market imperfections whereas high-tech industry affiliation may increase them.
Price revisions relative to the original filing price range, both in raw form (PREV) and public-information-adjusted form (REV), are approximately symmetrically distributed around zero in the full sample. The median value of unadjusted price revisions PREV is exactly zero for all three quality terciles.
The absolute value of price revision increases monotonically with bank reputation. The mean absolute value of price revision is 0.161 for firms taken public by high-quality underwriters, but only 0.110 for those by low-quality underwriters. This preliminary evidence is consistent with the notion that high-quality underwriters are more active in aggregating information in the bookbuilding period.
Consistent with Beatty and Welch (1996) , Cooney, Singh, Carter and Dark (2001) , Habib and Ljungqvist (2002) , and Kumar, McGee and Womack (1998), we find that reputable underwriters are associated with higher average underpricing than lowquality underwriters (25.2% vs. 11.8%). Initial returns are highly skewed: median underpricing is between 5.4% and 8.7% in the three terciles.
Mean BHARs are near zero in our sample. Our three-to-six month horizons are too short to capture the long-run underperformance identified by the literature; this pattern emerges around twelve months. However, consistent with previous literature (Brav and Gompers, 1997) , the aftermarket performance of IPOs with reputable underwriters is superior. The mean 6-month BHAR for top-tercile underwriters is 3.9%
and for bottom-tercile underwriters is -4.3%.
Variance Ratios
Our main test statistic is a "variance ratio" constructed as follows. We consider the subsample of IPOs underwritten by reputable banks, and construct REV and BHAR measures for each observation (i.e., each IPO). We then take the standard deviation across all observations in that subsample to obtain σ (REV) for high-quality banks. We compute σ (BHAR) in a similar manner. The variance ratio (VR) is defined as the ratio of these two numbers. VRs for the other two terciles are computed similarly.
As discussed in the introduction, we expect lower VRs for reputable underwriters.
The reason is that price changes should be modest during periods in which no new information arrives, but highly variable during periods of significant price discovery.
Ceteris parabus, therefore, primary market information aggregation will tend to inflate σ (REV). It will also tend to deflate σ (BHAR) because issue quality revealed by primary market need not be re-discovered by the secondary market. Both the numerator effect and denominator effect tend to reduce VR.
Our evidence strongly confirms this hypothesis. As Table 2 indicates, reputable banks have lower variance ratios in the full sample and in each 5-year subperiod. For example, during 1980-1984 the 3-month VR for reputable underwriters was 1.186, versus 2.718 for low-quality underwriters. We employ bootstrapping to measure the statistical significance of this result. Specifically, we randomly place IPOs into three terciles (regardless of their true underwriter quality). For each synthetic group we compute the variance ratios and then record the differences in variance ratio across the random groups.
We repeat the above steps 1,000 times to derive an empirical distribution of differences in variance ratios between the two synthetic subsamples.
Similar results hold in the full sample and in each subperiod, though not always with significance. In particular, the gap between the VRs of reputable and non-reputable underwriters becomes noticeably smaller (though of the same direction) during the two periods associated with the tech boom and its subsequent collapse, that is, 1995 is, -1999 is, in Panel E and 2000 in Panel F. We suspect that the narrowing of this VR gap is driven mainly by the bubble period's anomalously high σ (BHAR) of tech firms, which were disproportionately underwritten by reputable banks. Table 2 , Panels G and H, confirm this intuition. Removing tech firms from these two subperiods magnifies the difference between the VR of low-quality and high-quality underwriters.
Overall, lower variance ratios for reputable underwriters appear to be a very robust feature of our data set. We conclude that reputable underwriters resolve a greater proportion of uncertainty in the primary markets.
Is the VR Result Due to the Numerator or the Denominator?
We now consider the components of VR, σ (BHAR) and σ (REV), and ask which factor drives our variance ratio results.
Turning first to σ (REV), Table 2 Panel A shows a dramatic difference: in the full sample, the cross-sectional standard deviation of price revisions is 17.0% for low-quality banks and 28.1% for high-quality banks. The pattern repeats in every subperiod as well, and is always significant at the 1% level. The result also holds for a variety of untabulated robustness checks: using raw price revisions (PREV) rather than publicinformation adjustment price revisions, and partitioning the sample either into tech and non-tech offerings or into VC-backed on non-VC backed offerings.
In fact, low-quality underwriters often leave their prices literally unchanged during the course of bookbuilding. To reinforce the notion that this effect was due more to "substitution" rather than a true change in the economic role of reputable underwriters during the bubble, consider To summarize, reputable underwriters have lower variance ratios in every subperiod and in the full sample. Subperiod analysis indicates that this effect is typcially due both the numerator and the denominator of the variance ratio. However, a "changing composition" (or Simpson's paradox) effect plays a role in reputable underwriters being associated with higher σ (BHAR) in the full sample.
Time Series Volatilities
In this subsection, we conduct an analysis similar to that of Section 3.2 but using time-series volatility rather than a cross-sectional measure. Again the argument is that primary market price discovery should reduce secondary market risk.
The advantage to this approach is that it allows us to directly control for firm characteristics since each IPO has a volatility measure. (In contrast, for the section 3.2 results, each IPO has only a realized BHAR; the variability measure must then be computed across all IPOs in the tercile.) The disadvantage is that we do not have a time series measure of pre-market price adjustments. We are thus unable to offer a time-series analog of the variance ratio. As such, these results serve as a robustness check of our σ (BHAR) results, not of our main VR tests.
Our methodology is as follows. We use the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model, estimating factor loadings for each IPO using the first 1200 daily observations (or as many are available, if fewer than 1200). We compute abnormal daily returns as the residuals of the non-intercept Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model. The market, size, value and momentum factor are all from Kenneth R. French's website. The first trading day is excluded. That is, reputable banks are associated with reduced volatility in every subperiod except those overlapping the bubble. Yet this one subperiod reversal is so dramatic -and there is such a strong substitution toward reputable underwriters during this hot period -as to cause higher volatility in the full sample. Hence the full sample statistics appear to contradict the behavior of a typical subperiod. Panels G through I demonstrate that removing tech stocks from this subperiod reverses this anomalous result, so that both the full sample and all subperiods show a uniform relationship between reputation and secondary market risk. 
Results Using Each Investment Bank as an Observation
This section considers a variant of the tests in Section 3.1 using each bank (rather than each IPO) as the unit of observation. Specifically, for a given bank, we measure the buy-and-hold return on each of its offerings and then compute the cross-sectional variance of these returns. We then compute the cross-sectional variance of the pre-IPO price revisions of these same offerings. Finally, we define the "variance ratio" of this bank to be the ratio of these two numbers. To ensure reasonably stable estimates we keep in our sample only underwriters with more than 5 offerings. 7 Using the same CarterManaster tercile cutoffs of 6.75 and 8.5 described in Section 2, we are left with 35 highquality banks, 47 medium-quality and 129 low-quality banks. Finally, we compute the descriptive statistics of variance ratios of banks within each tercile, i.e. the average variance ratio for reputable banks, and so on.
Untabulated examination shows the variance ratios thus obtained are highly skewed. In all three terciles, the skewness of variance ratios is an order of magnitude larger than mean, median or standard deviation. Therefore, subsequent statistical analysis employs the natural logarithm of the variance ratio for each bank. Table 6 summarizes the statistical significance of the differences in log variance ratios for the full sample. Low-quality underwriters have higher ratios than either other terciles, and this difference is significant at both horizons. Thus, the results of Section 3.2 are robust to using banks as the unit of observation.
In untabulated results, we also consider the possibility that underwriter reputation is the endogenous result of issuer firm characteristics and use a two-stage least-squares procedure to estimate the model. Again we obtain significant, negative coefficients for bank reputation. Table 7 summarizes the results of an OLS regression estimating the determinants of banks' variance ratios. The control variables are the average of characteristics of IPOs offered by each bank. As expected, the coefficient on reputation is significantly negative.
The coefficients on the other control variables are of independent interest. Recall our argument in the introduction that variance ratios serve as an additional control for difference in firm types across underwriter terciles. Specifically, we claim that if one tercile is associated with heightened uncertainty, this risk should inflate both the numerator and denominator of the VR. It follows that firm characteristics should not load in this regression. As Table 7 shows, these coefficients are indeed typically insignificantly different from zero; firm age has only borderline significance.
7 Far fewer observations are needed to estimate second moments than first moments. Previous drafts of the paper variously used either a cutoff of seven and/or winsorized returns at the 1% level to control for outliers. These approaches cause little qualitative change, although increasing the minimum observation threshold reduces the number of low-quality banks in the sample.
Partial Adjustment as a Function of Underwriter Quality
Our final hypothesis is that the partial adjustment to private information is more pronounced for prestigious underwriters. This prediction will hold provided that they act in the costly information extraction role suggested by Benveniste and Spindt (1989) , while low-quality underwriters play a purely distributional role as in Rock (1986) .
Note that the tests in the section involve the joint hypotheses 1) reputable banks are more effective in primary market information aggregation, and 2) Benveniste and Spindt's model is a useful description of how this aggregation occurs. In contrast, the evidence in Sections 3 and 4 pertains only to the first of these hypotheses. This zero correlation is consistent with Rock (1986) rather than Benveniste and Spindt (1989) , and such an interpretation holds intuitive appeal. One might characterize low-quality underwriters as structuring a mechanism that is effectively a fixed-price sale (even if the offer might be technically classified by academic studies as bookbuilding).
Without the resources to extract private information in a cost-effective way, low-quality underwriters may instead simply set an offer price based mechanically on the value of public comparables, letting the secondary market bid the issue to its true value.
As the table shows, this correlation rises in a nearly monotonic way as quality increases. For underwriters ranked nine, the correlation is .490, corresponding to a high degree of predictability. This confirms Benveniste and Spindt's prediction. In conjunction with our variance evidence, this pattern reinforces the view that reputable underwriters act in the costly information acquisition role posited by Benveniste and Spindt.
A more formal investigation of this relationship involves the regression of underpricing on REV as well as firm-specific risk proxies, as in Hanley (1993) . As
Edelan and Kadlec (2005) point out, this estimation needs to account for censoring of the sample. In particular, underpricing is observed only when the offer is completed, yet the decision to withdraw (or not) is correlated with the information revealed during bookbuilding, and therefore REV.
To address this issue, we employ a Heckman (1976 Heckman ( , 1979 two-stage procedure. and SPILLOVER only to demonstrate that our sample does exhibit partial adjustment to public information, as in previous literature.)
Consider specification (1). In a regression without the interaction term (price revision times reputation) partial adjustment to private information would be indicated by positive loading on REV. By contrast, here we evaluate the coefficient on REV*REPU, i.e., whether more reputable underwriters exhibit stronger partial adjustment.
The observed coefficient .137 is indeed highly significant, both economically and statistically. In Table 10 , we quantify economic significance by considering a hypothetical offering, varying only underwriter quality and REV. For an underwriter with
Carter-Manaster rank 4, for example, a one-standard deviation shock to REV increases underpricing by only .123 standard deviations, versus an increase of .331 standard deviations when rank is nine, corresponding to a 169% increase in economic power. In regression specification (2), we replace the interaction term with a trichotomized interaction term indicating which tercile the bank is in. The variable Medium (High) takes the value 1 if the issuer's underwriter falls in to the middle (upper) tercile, and zero otherwise.
This change enables us to identify whether the positive coefficient on (REV*REPU) is due to the difference between the low-quality tercile and the others, or rather due to the difference between high-quality tercile and the others. The .753 coefficient on (REV*High) is highly significant while the .157 coefficient on (REV*Medium) is insignificant. Hence the partial adjustment result of Hanley (1993) appears to be almost exclusively due to the behavior of underwriters in the top tercile rather than due to both the top and medium terciles.
Specifications (3) and (4) allow for asymmetric responses to private information.
As pointed out in the literature, Benveniste and Spindt's argument is based on the difficulty of extracting positive information: an investor does not need to be rewarded for supplying negative information. In our context, this predicts a difference in the coefficients on (REV + )*REPU and (REV -)*REPU. In other words, not only should we observe stronger partial adjustment for reputable underwriters but this difference should be due to underadjustment to good news rather than to bad news.
Such an asymmetry is clear in Table 9 . The coefficient .246 on (REV + )*REPU is positive, with a high degree of both statistical and economic significance. By contrast the coefficient on (REV -)*REPU is small; in fact, it is negative with borderline significance.
Finally, recognizing that our error terms may be correlated with our supposedly "independent" variables, we also employ an instrumental variables approach to address the potential endogeneity of underwriter reputation. The instrument we choose for reputation is the average reputation of the underwriters employed by offerings in the same 2-digit SIC code within the past year. In the first step we regress reputation on this instrument to obtain an expected value of reputation. We then employ this instrument in the second stage, both on its own and in the interaction items as well. The expected value of reputation is used to re-classify our IPO sample into three terciles, and the indicator variables Medium and High are then re-defined accordingly. The results are summarized in Table 11 and are qualitatively similar to those of Table 9 .
In summary, the partial adjustment of reputable banks is both more pronounced and more asymmetric than that of non-reputable banks. To the extent that Benveniste and Spindt's model has support in the cross-section, we conclude that this support is due to the behavior of reputable underwriters. 
Conclusions
Our evidence suggests that reputable banks are more active in primary market information aggregation than non-reputable banks. The price revisions of underwriters in the top tercile are 65% more variable than those in the bottom tercile. In fact, low-quality banks frequently have price revisions of exactly zero dollars.
This information aggregation apparently substitutes for secondary market price discovery. In particular, both cross-sectional aftermarket return variance and time-series volatility are lower for high-quality banks in all time periods (except tech firms during the bubble period). We conclude that reputable banks have a higher relative proportion of information asymmetry resolved during the bookbuilding period rather than in the secondary market.
Our analysis is silent on exactly how reputable banks achieve this superior price discovery role, although there are several natural candidates. Top-tier banks have access to a broader pool of institutional investors. Perhaps as a result they can better target investors that they suspect have value-relevant information. Even for a fixed group of investors, reputable underwriters have more established relationships, and they might leverage their standing to extract information more aggressively (Sherman, 2005 ).
Yet another possibility is suggested by Chen and Wilhelm (2005) , who argue that the optimal sale mechanism involves non-uniform pricing. Underwriters use repeat institutional investors to stage the offering: the ultimate investors may not acquire the stock until after secondary market trading begins. This procedure effectively circumvents uniform pricing regulations and enhances the efficiency of the process. In the context of our results, low-quality underwriters are unlikely to have the "well-connected network of repeat institutional investors" posited by Chen and Wilhelm yet needed to structure such a mechanism.
We also confirm that a central prediction of bookbuilding models -partial adjustment to private information -has much stronger support in the high reputation subsample. Again this evidence is consistent with a stronger price discovery role for reputable underwriters.
This finding may partially reconcile the disparate conclusions of Cornelli and
Goldreich (2003), who find significant empirical support for bookbuilding models, and Jenkinson and Jones (2004) , who do not. While not revealing the identity of the underwriter supplying their bookbuilding bid data, Cornelli and Goldreich do state that it is "top-tier" European underwriter. By contrast, the underwriter used by Jenkinson and Jones is classified in our middle tercile. Yet our Section 5 evidence suggests that the greater difference in primary market behavior is between top-tier banks and the others, rather than between the low-tier banks and the others.
Whatever the magnitude of this positive price discovery role of reputable banks, it ought to be traded off against their costs, which are not measured here. As a prominent example, the underwriting market appears to be less than perfectly competitive on a fee basis (Chen and Ritter, 2000) . The sample is 7,124 initial public offerings of equity between 1980 and 2006. In Panel B, the sample is divided accroding to the Carter-Manaster reputation rank of the lead underwriter, or in the case of multiple lead underwriters, the average of these values. PREV is defined as the percentage change from the midpoint of the original filing price range to the final offer price. REV is the percentage change attributed to private information rather than public information; its construction is described in more details in Section 2.1. Underpricing is defined as the percentage change from the offer price to the closing price on the first day of trading. Buy-and-hold abnormal returns are measured relative to the CRSP value-weighted index and exclude the first trading day. This table considers the following statistics. REV is the percentage change from the midpoint of the original filing range to the final offer price. This measure has been orthogonalized with respect to public information proxies as described in Section 3. BHAR is buy-and-hold abnormal return using the CRSP value-weighted index as a proxy. IPOs are then partitioned into three groups according to the reputation of their lead underwriter. Across all IPOs in a particular group, we compute the cross-sectional standard deviation of REV and BHAR observations. The variance ratio VR is the ratio of these two numbers. p-values of differences are calculated using a F-test on REV and BHAR, and in the case of variance ratios are bootstrapped (with two-tailed p-values reported). The first column gives the reputation ranking, the second column displays the systemetric response of underpricing to changes in REV , and columns 3 and 4 show the changes in underpricing given changes in positive REV and negative REV , respectively. 
